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1 Introduction
The textile and garment industry in Pakistan is important in two respects: foreign ex-
change earnings and employment creation. Textiles and garments constitute roughly 60%
of Pakistan's total exports, and the proportion of garments, in particular, has been grow-
ing in export earnings. Because the garment industry is labor intensive as compared to
the textile industry, it is more important in employment creation. Because of its impor-
tance, Pakistan was greatly concerned with the quota phase-out, which began in January
2005. Specically, Pakistan was alarmed by the potential for Chinese garment exports to
dominate the international market.
As expected, China has experienced a spike in its garment exports since the quota
phase-out. Garment exports from Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh have also expanded
rapidly, following China. Pakistan's garment exports, especially woven wear exports,
have shown consistent growth; however, its knitwear exports have grown at a sluggish
pace in the post-Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) period, especially until the year 2009.
An estimated 90% of Pakistan's knitwear factories have been closed since 2005. A distinct
feature of Pakistan's garment industry, in contrast with its international competitors, is
that the majority of sewing operators are males hired at piece rates. Interestingly, the
author's interviews reveal that a common feature of surviving knitwear factories is that
they hire and intend to hire more salaried female sewing operators. It seems that the
shift from male to female sewing operators is closely related to factory survival in the
intensied international competition, and one of the two objectives of this study is to
explore the reason behind this relationship.
In Pakistan, female labor force participation is low overall. To hire female workers,
business managers/owners must provide special facilities such as transportation. Labor-
supply-side factors also prevent women from working outside their homes. In fact, house-
hold factors seem stronger because even factories with sucient management skills to
hire female workers encounter diculty in increasing the proportion of female workers.
Another objective of this study is to explore the household-specic factors that cause
Pakistani women to work outside their homes. For this purpose, the study includes
a household survey conducted in Faisalabad, Pakistan's premier textile-producing city,
from May to July, 2012.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the trade perfor-
mance of Pakistan's garment sector and its change after the quota phase-out. Section 3
describes the characteristics of Pakistan's garment industry. Section 4 presents the au-
thor's interviews with the owners/managers of garment manufacturers-exporters, which
reveal the gradual shift that has occurred in Pakistan's garment industry in the post-MFA
period and the diculty in making such a change. Section 5 analyzes the household-
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specic factors underpinning Pakistan's female labor participation on the basis of the
household survey. In addition, this section reveals female sewing operators' substantial
nancial contribution to their households. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Overview of Pakistan's Garment Sector Trade Per-
formance and its Change in the Post-MFA Period
Figure 1 depicts the size of Pakistan's garment exports in terms of world-wide exports as
well as its South Asian and South East Asian competitors in 2011. The gures are taken
from the import data of US, EU, Canada, and Japan.1 Figure 2 compares the year-to-year
growth of Pakistan's garment exports and those of its major competitors to these four
countries since 2004. As expected, Chinese garment exports of both knitwear and woven
wear drastically increased in 2005. Among South Asian countries, India and Bangladesh
garment exports have expanded rapidly since 2005 despite the fact that both countries
were concerned about Chinese dominance over the garment export market after the quota
phase-out. Bangladesh's growth is, in fact, outstanding. In contrast, Pakistan's garment
exports, especially those of knitwear, experienced the most sluggish growth among the
major competitors from 2005 to 2009. It has been estimated that 90% of knitwear factories
have closed since the quota phase-out. However, in 2010 and 2011, the knitwear exports of
Pakistan recorded an equivalent or higher growth than that of India and Bangladesh. We
may attribute Pakistan's substantial performance in 2010 and 2011 to the higher interna-
tional price of cotton; increase in labor costs, especially in China and other countries; and
the Pakistan rupee's depreciation. However, considering the similar competitive environ-
ment among Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, that is, facing a higher international price
of cotton and currency depreciation, these factors cannot suciently explain the better
performance of Pakistan's knitwear industry.
Pakistan's performance in 2010 and 2011 may also reect a change observed in the
few surviving knitwear factories in Pakistan since 2005. Specically, these factories are
gradually shifting from male piece-rate to salaried female sewing operators. In these
factories, the current proportion of female operators is 15%-25% of the total sewing op-
erators, whereas their proportion was less than 10% in 2005, when the author conducted
the 2005-2006 survey on the garment manufacturers-exporters in Lahore. Furthermore,
the employers are planning to increase the proportion of female operators.
1There are three main reasons for using these four countries' import data instead of garment exporting
countries' export data: (1) the latest export data of some garment-exporting countries such as Bangladesh
are not yet reported, (2) these four countries' import data are generally more reliable than those of
garment-exporting countries, and (3) these four countries constitute over 90% of the export destinations
of all these garment exporting countries except for China.
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This recent change in Pakistan's knitwear sector employment strategy seems to have
also contributed to the change in their product quality. Figure 3 depicts the change in unit
prices in the EU market measured by price over weight2 between 2004 and 2011. The
knitwear unit price of Pakistan in the EU market was higher than that of Bangladesh
and Vietnam in 2004, but it became the lowest in 2011. Unit prices do not necessarily
measure the quality of products as unit prices can be low because of low production costs.3
However, the fact that Pakistan has the lowest unit price is unlikely to result from low
production costs because its production costs are not the lowest, as discussed in detail
in Section 3. Also, the increase in Bangladesh and Vietnam knitwear unit prices in the
EU market is unlikely to have resulted from increased production costs because these
countries have enjoyed the best performance in garment exports since 2004. With the
caveat of interpreting unit prices in mind, Pakistan's knitwear industry has apparently
focused on price competition without attempting to improve its product quality in the
post-MFA period. However, along with the recent shift from male to female sewing
operators, a gradual upgrade in product quality has been observed in Pakistan. This
quality improvement seems to have inuenced the greater growth of Pakistan knitwear
unit prices in 2010 and 2011 (Figure 4(a)). Interestingly, Pakistan's woven wear products'
unit price has increased more rapidly than that of the competitors' average (Figure 4(b)),
although the level of unit prices has remained the lowest (Figure 3(b)). The dierence
between these two industries' performance may be related to the fact that Pakistan's
woven wear industry has grown in the post-MFA period, whereas its knitwear industry
remained stagnant until 2009.
3 Features of Pakistan's Garment Industry
3.1 Low Prot Margin
Traditionally, Pakistan's textile industry (in the broad sense, including both upstream
textile industry and downstream garment industry) has grown with the upstream textile
industry, such as cotton yarn and fabric, by using its main agricultural product, raw
cotton. In made-ups, Pakistan has been better at producing towels, bed sheets, and home
textiles (curtains, furniture fabrics, etc.) than garments. Among garments, Pakistan's
garment exports chiey consist of woven wear such as denims and chinos, and low-priced
knitwear such as polo-shirts and T-shirts, typically sold at discount stores like Walmart.
2The quantities are not available for several categories of products, and thus the unit price is calculated
by price over weight, not over quantity. Unit prices are taken from the EU market because those in the
US market seem to have measurement errors in 2008. Except for the year 2008, the trend in unit prices
in the US market is similar to, though not as obvious as, that in the EU market.
3For example, see Hallak and Schott (2011).
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These low value-added garment products are relatively cheap and have the lowest prot
margin among garment products. Because of the low prot margin, Pakistan's garment
industry has been struggling against intensied price competition in the international
market following the quota phase-out.
The reasons for Pakistan's garment products' low prot margin lie in high production
costs as well as low-priced products. First, fabric is not necessarily cheaper in Pakistan
than in other competing countries despite the fact that Pakistan produces raw cotton (as
the 4th largest cotton producer in the world). Fabric constitutes 50%-60% of garment
production cost, and thus manufacturers must procure fabric at a cheap price. Pakistan's
raw cotton is short ber, which is used for producing coarse-count yarn. Coarse-count yarn
can be used in towels, bed sheets, denims, chinos, and low-priced T-shirts, but not in high-
priced garments such as ladies' blouses and fashionable shirts, for which manufacturers
must import ne-count yarn/fabric from the US, Egypt, or China.
Second, Pakistan's labor cost seems higher than that of other garment exporting coun-
tries. Although labor cost constitutes only 10%-20% of garment production costs, it is
an important factor in determining international competitiveness, because the garment
industry is highly labor intensive. In fact, China's recent wage increase is the main reason
for international buyers to begin looking to other countries as garment suppliers ("China-
Plus-One"). Table 1 compares wages in the garment industry across countries in 2006.4
Pakistan's high wage compared to that of other garment-exporting countries is striking,
given that Pakistan's unit price of garments for export is the lowest, as shown in Section
3 (Figure 3). The high labor cost in Pakistan's garment industry seems closely related to
a specic employment characteristic of that industry. The majority of Pakistan's sewing
operators are males hired at piece rates, while that in other garment exporting countries
such as Bangladesh and China are salaried females.
3.2 Male Piece Rate Sewing Operators
A distinct feature of Pakistan's garment industry, in contrast to its international com-
petitors, is that a majority of its sewing operators are males hired at piece rates. Overall,
female labor force participation is very low in Pakistan. According to the Labour Force
Survey of Pakistan 2010-2011, the percentage of female workers, excluding unpaid family
workers, is only 7.2% of the total females aged 10 and above. Furthermore, most working
women engage in agriculture, and the manufacturing sector accounts for only 10.9% of
all working women. Male workers dominate the manufacturing sector, at 82.1%. Among
manufacturing sectors, the garment sector, especially the sewing department, hires rela-
4Because of data availability, it is possible to compare only 2006 data across garment-exporting coun-
tries.
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tively more female workers than do other manufacturers. Nonetheless, the Haque's (2009)
study, based on 150 factories, reports that the proportion of female sewing operators was
12% and 16% of the total sewing operators in Lahore and Faisalabad, respectively.5 The
study remarks that this gure may be an over-estimation resulting from purposive sam-
pling to limit all male units to 20% or less, and that the dispersion is skewed toward
the lower end (for the proportion of female workers), with very few rms having a high
proportion of female workers. Low female labor participation is often attributed to the
Muslim culture and the purdah6 practice observed in South Asian countries.
In addition to this cultural environment, Pakistan's garment manufacturers-exporters
largely hire male sewing operators at piece rates because of the historical development
of Pakistan's garment industry. Pakistan's industrialization began with the development
of its upstream textile industry, such as spinning and weaving, shortly after its indepen-
dence in 1947. Pakistan's downstream garment industry is relatively young (with the
major surviving factories established after 1990), as Figure 5 shows. The garment in-
dustry was started mainly by the owners of the upstream textile industry.7 However,
as the upstream textile industry is capital intensive, those owners did not know how to
manage production workers in the labor-intensive garment industry. The easiest way
for them to deal with the garment industry's labor-intensive nature was to outsource
such management rather than manage workers, and so they put subcontractors in charge
of nding and supervising operators. Owners provided subcontractors with fabrics and
sewing machines, and in return for a lump-sum remuneration, subcontractors performed
cut, make, and trim (CMT) processes for the owners. Subcontractors were usually skilled
operators8and knew and/or trained other sewing operators in their neighborhood. They
also functioned as teachers for other sewing operators, and their relationship with op-
erators followed a form of apprentice system.9 These subcontractor/teachers hired and
5The proportion of female sewing operators is 36% in Karachi, which is understandable in this large,
cosmopolitan city. It is dicult to conduct surveys in Karachi because of its uncertain law and order
conditions, and the present study does not consider Karachi a feasible location for its survey.
6Purdah literally means "curtain" in Urdu. Purdah is the practice of gender segregation and the
seclusion of women in public, observed in South Asian countries.
7A typical case is the establishment of the garment division of Masood Textile Mills, Ltd., Pakistan's
leading textile and knitwear factory. The manager stated that they started their garment division in
1995, intending to expand into a value-added eld.
8These skilled sewing operators can be traced back to tailors in the caste system, though sewing
operators in the current garment industry are not necessarily from the tailor caste. Muslims deny the
caste system, but castes do exist as a biradari or seyp system in Pakistan. Biradari literally means
brotherhood and is a group of male kin in the patrilineal society. It used to (and to some extent, continues
to) determine one's profession in the village society. Seyp describes the hierarchical relationship between
land-owning farmers (zamindar) and landless people (kammee), who serve as carpenters (tarkhan), barbers
(nai), blacksmiths (lohar), tailors (darzi), etc., providing various services to zamindars in the village
society (Hirashima 1977). Seyp is conceptually dierent from biradari, but both indicate social class and
eectively mean caste or sub-caste.
9This informal relationship is called ustaad-shagrid, which literally means teacher-student. According
to Amjad (2005), ustaad-shagrid is observed in most industries in Pakistan. Although ustaad-shagrid can
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supervised operators to complete subcontracted work, and then took commission from
the lump-sum remuneration and paid each operator piece rates from the remainder. In
this so-called cell-manufacturing system, where a complete garment product is made by
a team of ve to six operators, certain experienced operators had the skill to complete a
nished garment product, such as a shirt or a pair of trousers.
Pakistan's current garment industry remains largely tied to this tradition. When gar-
ment factories began exporting, they were forced to hire these operators directly, not via
subcontractors-supervisors, because of the quality and labor compliance required by in-
ternational buyers. However, note that this change only had a small impact, altering only
the method of operator payment from indirect to direct payment, because the supervisor's
job continues to entail nding, training if necessary, and placing operators in the factory.
Most exporting manufacturers have also adopted the assembly-line system to replace the
cell-manufacturing system. Even so, they continue to hire operators at piece rates in that
the number of pieces completed determines operators' earnings.10
Factory owners who continue to hire male sewing operators at piece rates often com-
plain about the lack of quality operators. The literature reveals that it is dicult to
control products' quality with a piece-rate remuneration system (Lazear 1986, Freeman
and Kleiner 1998, Baland et al. 1999). Contract theory states that although the piece-
rate remuneration system is optimal for types of work completed individually and identical
across individuals, the salaried (xed-rate) remuneration system is optimal for types of
work performed by a team and dierent across individuals (Itoh 1991, Bolton and De-
watripont 2005). Applying this theoretical system to Pakistan's garment industry, salary
payment seems optimal for current exporting manufacturers because they have adopted
the assembly-line system, whereas piece-rate payment was optimal for the industry's early
cell-manufacturing system. The piece-rate operators do have experience in stitching but
do not t into assembly line work. Then why do factory owners not switch from piece
rates to a salaried system? They maintain the piece-rate remuneration system because it
is an easy way to incentivize workers when human-resource-management skills are insuf-
cient. Also, it is easier to hire piece-rate operators when there is decient supply-chain
management, which is necessary to secure constant orders. With the piece-rate system,
owners can easily lay o piece-rate workers with no payment obligation when they have
provide cheap on-the-job training, it sacrices quality and productivity.
10The number of pieces completed depends on other operators in the same assembly line, and is
identical across all operators in the same line. In this sense, it is dierent from the piece-rate system in
the conventional sense (i.e., the number of pieces completed by piece-rate workers does not depend on
other operators). However, it is still called a "piece-rate" system, in which the operators' earnings are
determined by the number of pieces completed, not by the time they work. In this so-called "piece-rate"
system in Pakistan's garment industry, the piece rate is typically determined by an operator's level of
stitching work and sewing speed, which is tested on the day he starts working. For example, if Operator
A sews twice as fast as Operator B, the piece rate of Operator A is twice that of Operator B.
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no orders.
The author's 2005-2006 survey revealed that sewing operators could earn more under
the piece-rate system (Table 2); therefore, they preferred being hired at piece rates (Table
3). Estimation of the Mincer-type earnings equation supports this nding with a signi-
cantly positive eect of piece-rate status on earnings (Table 4; for summary statistics, see
Appendix Table A1).11 The fundamental reason for the dierence in earnings may not be
the payment system itself but the type of work that is closely linked with the piece-rate
system. The typical work assigned to an individual operator in the factories that adopt
the salaried system is simpler, and thus a salaried operator earns less. The piece-rate
remuneration system is very closely connected with male operators in the apprentice sys-
tem, and thus hiring female operators is necessary to achieve the shift from a piece-rate
to a salaried remuneration system.
4 Interviews: Gradual Shift in Pakistan's Knitwear
Industry in the Post-MFA Period
The focus of this section is the knitwear industry, which accounts for 60% of Pakistan's
garment exports. Pakistan's knitwear industry can provide a useful case study for clearly
understanding the features and problems in Pakistan's garment industry. The knitwear
industry recorded sluggish growth in the post-MFA period. However, as mentioned in
Section 2, Pakistan's knitwear exports performed equivalently well or even better in 2010
and 2011 as compared with Bangladesh and India, whose exports have continued to
record high growth since the quota phase-out. To explore the reasons underpinning the
2010 and 2011 growth and the poor performance after the quota phase-out until 2009, the
author conducted interviews with 12 garment manufacturers-exporters (seven of which
deal in knitwear) in Lahore12 in November-December, 2011. These interviews revealed
the following facts. (1) Knitwear manufacturers-exporters have suered severely since the
quota phase-out. Roughly 90% of the factories have closed since 2005. In reality, out of the
15 knitwear factories where the author conducted the 2005-2006 workers' survey, only two
survived. However, the surviving knitwear manufacturers-exporters are growing rapidly
(with export value growing at more than 20% per year). The Pakistan knitwear industry's
11A caveat in interpreting the estimation result is that the piece-rate status may be endogenous,
although operators cannot freely choose salaried or piece-rate status. The endogeneity problem may not
be too serious as dropping this variable does not largely change the estimation results. It is also interesting
to observe the dierence in the change in 2004-2006 earnings between the piece-rate and salaried workers.
The estimation results (Appendix Table A2) demonstrate that the coecient of piece-rate status has a
signicantly negative eect on earnings growth. This nding may reect factories' recent eorts to shift
from the piece-rate to salaried payment system or the decline in orders after the quota phase-out.
12Lahore is Pakistan's second largest city after Karachi and is one of the three major cities of Pakistan's
garment industry. It is a three-hour drive from Pakistan's largest textile city, Faisalabad.
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relatively good performance since 2010 may result from the shakeout of factories, that
is, only ecient factories survived. (2) Woven wear (mainly denim wear) manufacturer-
exporters have been growing since the quota phase-out, especially in the EU market. The
dierence in performance between knitwear and woven wear industries is consistent with
the trade data reported in Section 2 (Figure 2).
Although the causality cannot be ascertained,13 surviving knitwear factories share one
distinct feature, i.e., attempting to shift from male piece-rate sewing operators to salaried
female operators.14 In these factories, the current proportion of female operators is 15%-
25% of the total sewing operators, while the proportion was less than 10% in 2005,15 and
they are planning to increase the proportion of female operators. The female operators
are hired as salaried, meaning that these factories have also increased their proportion of
salaried workers. One of the factories has completely shifted their payment method from
piece-rate to salaried, even for male operators.16 Siegmann (2005) also notes the Pakistan
garment sector's shift in payment method from piece rates to salaries due to concern
over quality. The current proportion of female operators (15%-25%) seems relatively high
compared with the proportion (less than 15%) in the author's 2005-2006 survey17 and
the proportion (12%) reported in Haque's (2009) more comprehensive study. Siegmann
13The positive relationship between export orientation and the share of female employment in devel-
oping countries is often noted (see Wood 1991, Cagatay 2001, Siegmann 2005).
14This feature is not observed, at least among the woven wear factories in which the author conducted
interviews. One reason may be that the woven wear industry has already hired a larger percentage of
female workers than the knitwear industry. Haque's (2009) study, based on 150 garment factories, reports
that the share of female workers was 24.0% in the woven wear industry but only 14.1% in the knitwear
industry.
15An exception is the foreign-owned factory, where the percentage of female operators has always been
100%. One of the two surviving knitwear factories where the author conducted the 2005-2006 survey
hired all female sewing operators when it began operation in 2001. They have grown rapidly during
2006-2011, with a 77.9% increase in the number of sewing operators, whereas many knitwear factories
have closed during the same period. The fact that the factory owner is a foreigner (Belgian) may explain
the dierence in strategy compared to other factories with predominantly Pakistani owners. The Belgian
owner explained that they have hired only females as sewing operators because females are more easily
trained and disciplined, are more suitable to the European system, and have better working behavior.
16A human resource manager at a surviving knitwear manufacturer-exporter who supplies NIKE says
that all the sewing operators have shifted from piece rates to salaried since 2007 in response to NIKE's
request. Specically, they pay Rs. 7,500 as a base salary plus incentive payments at piece rates. He says
that NIKE prefers salary payment to piece rates because of the issues of quality and labor compliance. The
piece-rate system is considered to invariably compromise quality. Salaried workers have fringe benets
such as medical insurance and old age pensions, which piece-rate workers lack, and salaried workers are
protected by the minimum wage law. Owners/managers consider that as long as they have constant
orders, they can hire salaried operators.
17The 2005-2006 survey conducted by the author covers 22 garment factories in Lahore and revealed
that the proportion of female workers (except for one factory that hires only female sewing operators) was
0%-15% of the total production workers, depending on the factories' size. Note that the base gure is the
total production workers, not total sewing operators. The proportion of females among the total sewing
operators is smaller than 15% as most of the nishing department production workers were females, even
in 2006. Usually, larger factories had a higher proportion of female production workers. See Makino
(2008).
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(2009) also reports the replacement of male operators by female operators after the quota
phase-out. The managers of these factories say that females are better suited to being
salaried sewing operators on the assembly line. To hire salaried operators, managers must
deal with the worker incentive problem, and they say that females have a better work
ethic.18 Haque's (2009) interviews with managers in 150 factories reveal that, according
to them, female workers provide better quality work; do not waste time; work harder;
and are more responsible, productive, loyal, honest, and punctual than male workers.
Another advantage in hiring female workers is reduced labor cost. Female workers perform
more specialized and narrow work on the assembly line and accept lower wages. The
interviews revealed that the monthly earnings of male piece-rate sewing operators were
around Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 13,000 (about $133 to $144) on average, while those of female
sewing operators on a salaried basis were Rs. 7,840 (about $87).19 These wages cannot
be straightforwardly compared because the type of stitching work, number of working
hours, and the educational level usually dier between male piece-rate operators and
female salaried operators. However, evidence of gender discrimination in wages suggests
that female workers in Pakistan's garment sector earn about 14% less than their male
counterparts when controlling for the educational level, experience, marital status, work
hours, city, and size and type of rm (Haque 2009). The author's estimation of the
Mincer-type earnings equation in Section 3 also supports this nding, estimating that
male workers earn 18.2% more than females when controlling for these characteristics
(Table 4). A caveat to these results is that neither study controls for the dierence in
stitching speed between male and female operators, as explained below.
Then why did other factories, especially those that failed, not adopt the strategy
of shifting from male piece-rate operators to salaried female operators? There is one
obvious disadvantage in hiring female workers. According to the managers, the eciency
rate calculated on the basis of stitching speed20 is lower for female operators than for
18One of the managers related examples. Although most male workers did not return on time immedi-
ately after the Eid holidays, regardless of whether they were hired at piece rates or salaried, all the female
workers returned on time. On a daily basis, male workers go out to lunch and do not return on time,
but female workers bring their lunch as they cannot freely move about outside, and promptly start work
after lunch break. Factories are more likely to ignore such behavioral problems when they hire workers
at piece rates, because managers pay workers only for what they produce, and so have less incentive to
correct workers' behavior. Although the potential problem may be the same for salaried male workers,
managers have more incentive to correct workers' behavior because they have to pay salaries even to
workers who do not return on time.
19Abras (2011) reports a similar gender wage gap in Pakistan. She also reports the widening wage gap
after the quota phase-out.
20The eciency rate is calculated as follows. Suppose that a sewing operator works for 8 h (480 min)
per day, and the factory has 300 sewing machines. Thus, it has 14,400 (= 480*300) available minutes.
Further suppose that the production of a polo-shirt requires 11 min. If the factory produces 1,000 polo-
shirts per day, the minimum total time required to produce them is 11,000 (= 11*1,000) min. The
resulting eciency rate of this factory is 76% (= 11,000/14,400).
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males.21 Female operators' eciency rate is 35%-50%, while male operators' eciency rate
is roughly 80%. To compensate for the low eciency rate of female operators, factories
must have a higher prot margin. This means that factories must produce medium-
to high-quality garment products because the prot margin and the quality of products
correlate positively. Theoretically, hiring male operators with higher eciency rates and
producing medium- to high-quality garment products would be more protable. However,
eciency here means only stitching speed and does not take quality into account. Mangers
say that as long as they have a high prot margin, they prefer female workers because their
working behavior and better quality work more than compensate for their lower eciency.
Additionally, as long as they continue hiring male operators at piece rates, they nd it
dicult to attract orders for medium- to high-quality garment products because customers
usually believe that controlling quality is dicult in the piece-rate system (Lazear 1986,
Freeman and Kleiner 1998, Baland et al. 1999).
Another issue in hiring salaried operators (whether female or male22) is that factories
must have constant orders and must deal with the worker incentive problem, as mentioned
earlier in this section. To have constant orders, the factories must both develop appro-
priate supply-chain management and recognize the concept of industrial engineering so
that they can deploy their operators at the appropriate time and place. Factories must
also seriously consider human resource management to mitigate the incentive problem
with salaried workers, though females innately seem to have less of such problem. More-
over, factories must commit to providing female workers with training and transportation.
Training is essential because, while males have at least the opportunity to learn stitching
skills in the apprentice system in their neighborhoods, females have no such opportunity
as they cannot easily walk around in public because of the purdah practice and because the
training opportunity in the formal training institutes is very limited. Transportation is
also necessary in the purdah culture, where females usually neither work nor walk around
freely outside their homes. In the context of Pakistan's culture, male household mem-
bers have decision-making power over whether their female members can work outside
their homes, and they usually dislike this idea. Some managers said that they encounter
diculty convincing male household members to permit their female members to work
in the factories. The factory makes an eort to convince them by, for example, inviting
male members of potential female workers' households to the factory to show them the
safe working environment and organizing workshops with local female activists, typically
21Haque's (2009) study reveals that the majority of managers and workers rate women as more pro-
ductive in work than men, but think that men can stitch more garments than women in a given time.
22Although the payment system, whether piece-rate or salaried, is conceptually independent of the
operators' gender, the piece-rate system is closely connected with male operators in Pakistan's garment
industry. Most managers who realize the importance of shifting from piece rates to salaried say that they
must begin with salaried female workers and train them to support such a shift.
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female members of political households in the villages where potential female workers
reside.
5 Household Factors Aecting Female Labor Partic-
ipation
Factory-side obstacles for hiring female workers have been discussed in Section 4, but
household-specic factors also aect women working outside their homes in Pakistan.
Haque's (2009) study suggests that labor-supply-side factors such as religious, social, and
cultural restrictions, rather than the lack of training opportunities and the transportation
problems, underpin the lack of female labor participation in the garment sector. The
majority of managers do not oppose hiring women (Table 5(a)), but the majority of male
workers/supervisors oppose the women of their household working outside their homes
(Table 5(b)). To explore which factor, factory or household side, contributes more to
the low female labor participation in Pakistan's garment sector, the author conducted a
household survey in May-July, 2012, in Faisalabad, Pakistan's premier textile city, thus
fullling the survey's objective of empirically revealing the household factors that explain
female labor participation in Pakistan.
The interviews with garment factory human resource managers reveal that the main
reason why women work outside their homes is nancial need.23 That is, if male members
of the household earn enough to support the entire family, female members do not work
outside their homes. This nding is consistent with the Haque's (2009) study, according
to which the majority of respondents (both managers and workers/supervisors) agree that
a female should stay at home if her husband/father earns enough. It is also consistent
with previous research suggesting that economic need is an important factor that pushes
women into Pakistan's labor market (Sultana et al. 1994, Khan et al. 2005, Ahmad
and Hafeez 2007, Khan and Khan 2009). Increased female labor participation due to
nancial necessity does not, in itself, signify an overall enhanced status for women in
Pakistan's current cultural environment. Nonetheless, empirical proof of factors aecting
female labor participation in Pakistan's garment sector is meaningful because female
labor participation and better performance in the export market are related, as discussed
in Sections 3 and 4.
23A female manager explained that young (premarriage) women often work for their dowries. Young
women's labor force participation to save for their dowry is also described by Khan et al. (2005) and
Khan and Khan (2009).
12
5.1 Description of 2012 Household Survey in Faisalabad
The household survey was conducted in Faisalabad in May-July, 2012, to explore the
factors aecting female labor participation in Pakistan's garment sector. To achieve this
objective, the sample contained both types of households: (i) households whose female
members work in garment factories as sewing operators (Type I households), and (ii)
households other than Type I households (Type II households). After conducting the
feasibility study, the survey design was nalized as follows.24
First, ve factories that hire a relatively high percentage of female sewing operators
were randomly chosen from the list of factories provided by UNDP-Pakistan.25 Those
factories in turn provided a list of all female sewing operators, including the worker's
personal information such as her name, address, and her father's or husband's name, and
his phone number.26 In the list, workers are categorized by their union councils/villages
that are the primary sampling unit in this survey, and 12 villages were randomly selected.
From these 12 villages, we randomly selected 110 female sewing operators. The number
of female workers selected in each village was proportionate to the total female workers
in each village in the list. These female workers' households constitute the sample's Type
I households. We then obtained each chosen village's voter list, which provides voters'
household information, such as each voter's name, sex, age, house number, and ward
number. Among the households with at least one female voter, we randomly selected
households constituting the sample's Type II households.27 We determined the number
of Type II households selected in each village that would maintain each village's ratio
24Originally, two other strategies were considered to include a sucient number of Type I households in
the sample. The rst strategy was to locate and perform random sampling in villages where the garment
factories provide bus transportation. However, the feasibility study found that the bus transportation is
provided radially along several main roads. Female workers get on/o bus at the main road's bus stop
and come and go independently to their own villages, and so Type I households are scattered among
many villages. Because the number of Type I households is very limited in each village, a random
sampling at the village level is less likely to nd Type I households. The second strategy was to perform
a simple random sampling of 100 Type I households from the factories' female workers' list. Because
female workers commute from a great variety of villages, the sampling might have produced 100 villages,
making the interview process unfeasible nancially. Therefore, a random sampling of villages using the
female workers' list was taken as a strategy.
25UNDP-Pakistan has been implementing the Gender Promotion Programme (GENPROM) with the
objective to increase female labor participation in the garment sector, and has provided training to female
workers in garment factories.
26In Pakistan, women are usually identied in relation to their father or husband. When the survey team
asked a woman's neighbors (actually, we rarely saw females on the street) about the location of her house
using her own name, no neighbor knew where she lived, but when we asked using her father's/husband's
name, neighbors could tell us the house's location. Mirza (2002) also noted this phenomenon. We also
needed the women's husband's/father's mobile number because women were usually reluctant to provide
their own mobile number, but were more willing to provide their father's/husband's number.
27Among all the households obtained by a simple random sampling in the villages, only two households
had any female member working as a sewing operator in a garment factory, and so these households
identied by a simple random sampling were nearly identical to the Type II households described in (ii).
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of Type I to Type II households at 1 to 3.5.28 Six of the 12 villages were located in
an urban area, and were thus not suburban villages but residential colonies29 with very
few professional farmers owning agricultural land. The other six villages were located in
suburban areas with land-owning farmers. In the random sampling of Type II households,
medium to large land-owning farmers (more than ve acres of land) were dropped. We
restricted the sample to only small land-owning farmers to include only Type II households
that were comparable to Type I households, given that households with female members
working in the garment factories have no land for cultivation.
The author and the enumerators (hereafter the survey team) visited each household
and conducted interviews using the original two-part questionnaire. The rst part con-
tains questions to the household head and includes typical questions for any household
survey, such as household members' demographic/nancial characteristics and the origi-
nal questions that address the study's objective (e.g., a question measuring the household
head's attitude toward women working outside their homes). The second part contains the
women's questionnaire, whose respondent is a female member of the household. When at
least one of the female household members worked, the survey team selected this woman
as the respondent to this part. If no woman worked, the survey team selected any non-
student woman of comparable age to women working in factories (i.e., usually ages 16-45
and preferably in the younger range, if available, as the majority of sewing operators are
young and unmarried). While conducting the women's interviews, the survey team at-
tempted to maintain the respondent women's privacy as much as possible, for example, by
requesting a separate interview room so that the women could answer without feeling any
pressure from their male household members. The questionnaire was carefully designed
to identify which type of factors, factory- or household-factors, chiey contributes to low
female participation in the garment industry.
Table 6 presents the sample's descriptive statistics. The total number of eective Type
I households is 107, and that of Type II households is 369. No female member works
outside their home in 79% of Type II households. In the remaining Type II households,
female members work for pay outside, but not as a sewing operator. Typical jobs for
these women are clippers in garment factories,30 housekeepers, teachers in girls' school,
nurses, and agricultural labor. Surprisingly, most teachers in private schools earn less
than sewing operators in the garment sector. Comparing the sample means between two
types of households reveals that female household heads comprise a greater proportion
28The original target of the survey was to have 100 Type I households and 350 Type II households.
Because some missing or incomplete information was expected, the survey team decided to begin with a
sample of 110 Type I households and 385 Type II households.
29The history of these colonies is not old, and they were typically developed in the 1970s under the
Zulkar Ali Bhutto socialist regime to provide residential land to landless people.
30Clippers in the garment sector are typically females. The author observed that the majority of
clippers were females even in 2005-2006. Clippers' wages are lower than those of sewing operators.
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in Type I households (33%). The household head's education level is lower in Type I
households, below primary school on average. Type I households contain fewer infants,
which is understandable because females, especially mothers, are the primary caretakers of
small children. No Type I household owns land for cultivation, and so Type I households'
value of livestock is signicantly lower, Rs. 5,679 on an average. Type I households have
higher income at Rs. 184,953 on annual average, apparently a consequence of having
female members as additional income earners (or even as the primary breadwinner in
69% of the Type 1 households), whereas income earned by male members is signicantly
higher in Type II households. The value of home and residential land is less in Type I
households, Rs. 510,327 on annual average.
The women's questionnaire asked non-working women why they do not work for pay
outside their homes. Table 7 summarizes their answers. Reason Nos. 1-3 can be consid-
ered factory-side factors in that the factory decisions have a somewhat eect on whether
or not women work in the factory. Reason Nos. 4-8 are considered household-side factors.
Overall, the factory-side factors do not seem to prevent women from working outside their
homes, with very few women (1.7%) giving the unavailability of such work as a reason.
The majority of women (61.1%) answered that the reason is male members' refusal to
allow her to work outside the home. Besides, the majority of female workers (72.3%),
both sewing operators and others, said that they need permission from their male house-
hold members (fathers, husbands, or brothers), if any, to work outside their homes for
pay. These responses demonstrate that household factors, rather than factory-side factors,
contribute more to the low proportion of female sewing operators in Pakistan's garment
sector, even in factories with reasonable management skills.
5.2 Estimation Results: Household Factors Contributing toWomen's
Working in Factories
The simple probit model is estimated to analyze the household factors that aect female
labor participation in garment factories as well as in any work for pay outside the home.
The dependent variable takes the value one if the household allows their female members
to work outside the home, and zero otherwise. The set of covariates includes demographic
variables (age, education level, number of male/female household members, number of in-
fants, etc.), social variables (religion, caste, number of female teachers/government sta
among relatives, etc.), and economic variables (household income earned by male mem-
bers, assets, etc.). Note that in the context of Pakistan, household income earned by
males could be justiably considered exogenous to women's labor-force measurements be-
cause male members are considered as the household's primary breadwinner, making a
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simultaneous decision for both men and women to participate in paid labor unlikely.31
Additionally, the causality of women's working status upon their fertility decision, as
explored in the seminal Angrist and Evans's (1998) study, is unlikely because Pakistani
women usually do not have the decision-making power regarding the number of children.
Therefore, the number of infants is included in the covariates with a caveat: it could be
endogenous because the number of infants and the decision making regarding women's
labor participation may be simultaneously aected by male members' characteristics. The
potential endogeneity problem does not seem to severely aect the results, however, be-
cause the estimation using only the subsample of unmarried women does not substantially
change the results, as discussed below.
The estimation results are shown in Table 8. The rst column (1) reports the average
marginal eects of the set of covariates on the probability of household female members
working as a sewing operator in a factory, and the second column (2) reports those of
female members performing any type of work outside their homes. As expected, house-
hold assets (measured by the values of livestock and of the home and residential land)
negatively aect the probability of a woman's labor force participation. This nding sup-
ports the general principle that, in Pakistan, the main reason for women's labor force
participation is nancial. A woman's education level increases her labor force participa-
tion as a sewing operator in a garment factory, but at a decreasing rate. The status of
being a household head's daughter increases the probability of working outside, which is
easily understandable because mothers are usually busy with household chores, especially
childcare.
As the majority of female sewing operators are unmarried, the same model is estimated
with only the subsample of unmarried women (excluding those divorced or widowed). The
third (3) and fourth (4) columns are based on this subsample but use the same estimation
model corresponding to columns (1) and (2), respectively. Despite the decreased number
of observations, the estimation with the subsample has two advantages. (i) Women in the
subsample face two simple options, either working for pay outside or remaining idle at
home. Because column (4) compares the households with/without working women for pay
outside, the estimation can exclude the case in which girls remain at home to perform all
household chores for mothers working outside. (ii) The estimation would be less sensitive
to the endogeneity problem concerning the number of infants in the household because the
subsample excludes women with their own children. The results based on the subsample
of unmarried women are consistent with those using the full sample reporting the negative
eects of household assets, supporting the assumption that girls work outside for pay only
for nancial reasons, and the choice of remaining at home is rather a luxury. The positive
eect of a woman's education level at the decreasing rate in column (3) is also consistent
31See Sawada et al. (2006) for a similar discussion in the context of India.
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with that in column (1). Although it is not reported in the table, a woman's education
level actually decreases her labor force participation when controlling the literacy rate.
The minimum level of education (literacy) is necessary for women to work as an operator
in a garment factory, but when her education level becomes higher, as are women in richer
families, her participation decreases. This suggests that education is a luxurious good or
that accumulating education may be a rational investment decision for girls to increase
their value in the marriage market. Given that they are unmarried women who have not
yet had their own children, the number of infants becomes insignicant in columns (3)
and (4), supporting the assumption that women in the subsample are not the primary
caretaker of infants in the household. The insignicant eect of the number of non-infant
female members on the women's labor force participation as an operator also supports
this assumption. Consistent with columns (1) and (2), the number of female teachers
or of government ocers among relatives generally has a signicantly positive eect on
a woman's labor force participation, but not on the probability of a woman working as
a sewing operator in a factory. This nding may reect the fact that a woman working
in a factory is disrespected, while that working as a teacher in a girls' school or as a
doctor/nurse in a female clinic is esteemed in Pakistan. The practice of purdah restricts
women's contact with non-family male members. In this context, women working in
factories are despised, as the working environment naturally requires women to interact
with male colleagues (Mirza 2002). In contrast, working as a teacher in a girls' school
or a doctor/nurse in a female clinic is usually respected as such work does not require
contact with males. Working in government oces may require her to interact with male
colleagues, but government jobs are also respected as they pay well. Furthermore, women
in government oces usually have male family members working in the same place because
obtaining such a privileged job usually requires some connection in the oce, and thus
such women are protected at their workplace. Interestingly, Muslim households are more
likely to allow their unmarried girls to work outside. This is somewhat surprising because
women in Christian households usually have less prejudice against working outside,32 and
Christian household members have descended from the lower castes in Pakistan.
Finally, column (5) reports the average marginal eects on the probability of a house-
hold's female members working as sewing operators in a factory using the subsample of
households with women working outside for pay. This analysis identies factors that aect
female members becoming sewing operators in a garment factory, but not entering other
industries. Households with fewer assets are more likely to allow their female members
to work in a garment factory as an operator, which further supports the assumption that
32Table 9 in Sub-section 5.3 also supports the general belief that Christian women attach less stigma
to working outside. The nding that being Muslim matters only among the subsample of unmarried
girls may result from the required dowries being smaller among Christians, though the dierence in the
amount of dowries between Muslims and Christians is not well known.
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poor households allow their female members to work in a garment factory as a nancial
last resort. Daughters of household heads are more likely to work in a garment factory,
consistent with the relatively young age of female sewing operators.
5.3 Estimation Results: Determinants of Households' andWomen's
Attitude toward Working Outside the Home
This subsection reports the respondents' attitude toward the idea of women working
outside the home. Two types of questions in the questionnaire assess this attitude. One
asks the household head whether she/he thinks that it is generally a good idea for women
to work outside, and the other asks the female respondent to the woman's questionnaire
whether she would like to work outside if she has a choice.33 The bivariate probit model
is estimated, and Table 9 reports the results. The bivariate probit model is used because
both attitudes, and thus the error terms in both equations, are expected to be highly
correlated, and our interest is in the joint probability of these two household members'
attitudes.
Table 9's rst column (1) reports the average marginal eects of the set of covari-
ates on the household head's attitude, and the second column (2) reports those of the
female respondent. The high value of the LR test statistics, 30.68 (not reported in the
table), indicates that both equations are mutually dependent. Being in a Muslim house-
hold negatively aects both the household head's and the female respondent's attitudes
toward women working outside their homes. Interestingly, except for being a Muslim,
factors determining the household head's attitude seem dierent from those determining
the women's attitude. The negative eect of household assets, the household head's edu-
cation level, and the male members' income earning ability on women's attitude indicates
that women in more auent families have less motivation to work outside their homes.
It seems that, though male household members in the more auent families are not more
strongly against women working outside than are males in less auent households, female
members themselves of the more auent families underrate the idea of working outside
for pay. The existence of female relatives who work outside in respected elds (school
and government) positively aects women's attitude. In contrast, the existence of fe-
male relatives working outside in general (not in school/government) positively aects
the head's attitude. These results may imply that it is less dicult for the household
head to overcome the stigma of women working than for the women themselves. Interest-
ingly, having land for cultivation (i.e., belonging to a farming household) positively aects
33The exact question for the household head is "Do you think, generally speaking (not specically
about women in your household) that it is a good idea for women to work outside the home for pay if
there are other household members who can take care of their children"? The question for the female
respondent is "If you have a choice, would you like to work outside for pay"?
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women's attitude toward working outside for pay, though the sample contains few women
in land-owning households who actually work outside for pay. (Therefore, this variable is
dropped in the previous estimation reported in Table 8). In Pakistan's rural areas, women
commonly work outside as agricultural labor or their family's farm labor, so women in
farming households seem to attach less stigma to working outside, though the sample's
farming households are relatively more auent and do not have a nancial necessity to
allow their female members to work outside. A woman's education level positively aects
her attitude toward working outside. We can conclude that education motivates women
to participate in the workforce by overcoming their own prejudice against working outside
for pay.
5.4 Discussion: Impacts of Women Working in the Garment
Sector
The regression analysis suggests that only women in nancial need work outside their
homes, especially in the garment sector. Working as a female sewing operator is not
respected and is considered a nancial last resort for poor families, as reected in the
estimation result that a potentially good example of working women (i.e., female relatives
working in the school or government sector) does not motivate women to work in the
garment sector. The interviews revealed that female sewing operators in the garment
sector seem to undervalue their own work. Figure 6 depicts the dierence between the
responses of female sewing operators in factories and females working outside but not as
sewing operators. Those women who work at jobs other than sewing operators seem to
be more willing to continue working, with 82.4% of such women wanting to continue to
work (or actually doing so) even after having children, whereas a lower percentage (43%)
of female sewing operators express that attitude.
The questionnaire also asked all the women who responded "not willing to work outside
if they have a choice" why they have that attitude. Figure 7 depicts the reasons expressed
by women who would not like to work outside for pay if they have a choice. The gure
compares the answers between sewing operators and others. For non-sewing operators,
the answers are divided almost evenly among "not safe," "feel shame," "male members
upset," and "neglect household responsibilities." For sewing operators, the answers are
predominantly "feel shame," which implies that these women do not respect their own job.
The survey team encountered one household that rst refused to accept interviews because
the household head felt shame about letting his daughter work in a garment factory
(though nally he accepted the survey team). Some unmarried female sewing operators
told the author that nobody will marry a woman working in a factory. Surprisingly, female
income earning ability as a sewing operator aects women negatively in the marriage
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market.34
Nevertheless, female sewing operators contribute substantially to their households'
nances. As Table 6 reports, the household income is higher in households with female
sewing operators by 8.1%, and earnings by male members of such households are lower by
as much as 48.7%. Thus, female sewing operators are actually the primary breadwinners
in most (69.2%) of such households. Furthermore, the average annual income of these
sewing operators (Rs. 78,290) is not signicantly lower than the average annual income
of men (Rs. 83,241) at the 5% signicance level. The results suggest that female sewing
operators' substantial contribution to the welfare of poor households merits recognition.
6 Concluding Remarks
Pakistan's garment industry is unique in that primarily male sewing operators have tra-
ditionally been hired at piece rates, whereas in other garment exporting countries such
as China and Bangladesh, primarily female operators are hired on a salaried basis. This
study explores why Pakistan exhibits this tradition and how it relates to the performance
of its garment (especially knitwear) exports in the post-MFA period.
Although Pakistan's woven wear exports have grown rapidly, its knitwear exports
have suered and many factories have closed since the quota phase-out. The interviews
with managers in the garment sector revealed that the surviving knitwear factories have
increased and are planning to further increase the percentage of salaried female sewing
operators. To pursue this strategy, the factories must make eorts to improve their
management skills related to human resources and the supply chain and to provide special
facilities (training, transportation, etc.). We might reasonably attribute the relatively
good performance of Pakistan's knitwear exports since 2010 to these factories' recently
adopted tactical employment strategy.
The household survey conducted by the author reveals that as long as factories have
reasonable management skills in human resource and supply chain, it is primarily household-
side factors, rather than factory-side factors, that prevent women from working in Pak-
istan's garment sector. Financial needs are the main reason for women working outside
their homes, especially in the garment sector. Although Pakistani society scorns the idea
of working as a female sewing operator in a factory, these women contribute substantially
to their households' welfare. The measures that lower the women's reservation wage by
taking into account the social norm may help women overcome obstacles preventing their
labor participation. For example, providing a segregated working area for women or fe-
34Although this paper is about neither what determines the value of women in the marriage market
nor whether such value aects the amount of dowries as expected in the price model suggested by Becker
(1991), these are interesting research questions.
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male supervisors may convince the male household members that it is acceptable for their
female members to work at a factory. Enhancing women's education level seems to mo-
tivate women to work outside, though highly educated women in more auent families
actually do not work outside. The basic level of education, literacy, seems to encourage
women to work in a garment factory despite the job's low prestige and the women's own
disrespect for their job. Given Pakistan's overall low female literacy rate (46% nationally),
it seems important to provide girls the basic level of education. Such policy measures will
improve the welfare of Pakistan's poor households by increasing the number of females in
the paid workforce. Increasing the number of female workers willing to work in garment
factories will in turn benet Pakistan's garment exports.
References
[1] Abras, Ana Luisa Gouvea. 2011. "Success and Upgrading after the End of the MFA"
In Sewing Success? Employment and Wage Eects of the End of the Multi-bre
Arrangement, edited by Gladys Lopez Acevedo and Raymond Robertson, 58-96.
Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
[2] Ahmad, Eatzaz, and Amtul Hafeez. 2007. "Labour Supply and Earning Functions of
Educated Married Women: A Case Study of Northern Punjab." Pakistan Develop-
ment Review 46 (1) (Spring): 45-62.
[3] Amjad, Rashid. 2005. "Skills and Competitiveness: Can Pakistan Break out of the
Low-level Skills Trap?" Pakistan Development Review, 44 (4) Part I (Winter): 387-
409.
[4] Angrist, Joshua D. and William N. Evans. 1998. "Children and Their Parents' Labor
Supply: Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Family Size" American Economic
Review, 88(3): 450-477.
[5] Baland, Jean-Marie, Jean Dreze, and Luc Leruth. 1999. "Daily Wages and Piece
Rates in Agrarian Economies." Journal of Development Economics 59 (2) (August):
445-461.
[6] Becker, Gary S., 1991. A Treatise on the Family, Enl. Edition. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
[7] Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. 2005. Contract Theory. Cambridge: The
MIT Press.
21
[8] Cagatay, Nilufer. 2001. Trade, Gender and Poverty. New York, NY, UNDP.
(http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/
publications/poverty-reduction/poverty-website/trade-gender-and-
poverty/TradeGenderandPoverty.pdf, downloaded January 2012)
[9] Freeman, Richard B., and Morris M. Kleiner. 1998. "The Last American Shoe Man-
ufacturers: Changing the Method of Pay to Survive Foreign Competition." NBER
Working Paper Series. No.6750.
[10] Government of Pakistan, 2011. Labour Force Survey 2010-2011.
[11] Hallak, Juan Carlos and Peter K. Schott. 2011. "Estimating Cross-Country Dier-
ences in Product Quality." Quarterly Journal of Economics 126: 417-474.
[12] Haque, Ehsan-ul. 2009. Current Status and Prospects of Female Employment in the
Apparel Industry in Pakistan. UNDP-Pakistan.
(http://www.genprom.org.pk/pdf/21172.pdf, downloaded December 2011)
[13] Hirashima, Shigemochi. 1977. "Economic Analysis of non-Farmer Households in Pak-
istan Punjabi Villages." Asian Economies 18 (6&7): 135-154 (in Japanese).
[14] Itoh, Hideshi. 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations." Econometrica
59 (3) (May): 611-636.
[15] Khan, Rana Ejaz Ali, and Tasnim Khan. 2009. "Labor Force Participation of Married
Women in Punjab (Pakistan)." Journal of Economic and Social Research 11 (2): 77-
106.
[16] Khan, Shahzad Farid, Saira Akhtar, Amna Afzaal and Anila Kausar. 2005. "A So-
ciological Study of Working Women in Informal Sector of Readymade Garments
Industry in Faisalabad (Pakistan)." Journal of Agricultural and Social Sciences 1
(1): 60-61.
[17] Lazear, Edward P. 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates." Journal of Business 59 (3)
(July): 405-431.
[18] Makino, Momoe. 2008. "Competitiveness of the Garment Industry in Pakistan with
Particular Focus on Piece Rate Workers." In Globalization Employment and Mobility:
The South Asian Experience, edited by Hiroshi Sato and Mayumi Murayama, 94-123.
Palgrave Macmillan IDE-JETRO Series.
[19] Mirza, Jasmin. 2002. Between Chaddor and the Market-Female Oce Workers in
Lahore. Karachi:Oxford University Press.
22
[20] Sawada, Yasuyuki, Kensuke Kubo, Nobuhiko Fuwa, Seiro Ito, and Takashi Kurosaki.
2006. "On the Mother and Child Labor Nexus under Credit Constrains: Findings
from Rural India." Developing Economies 44(4): 465-499.
[21] Siegmann, Karin Astrid. 2005. "The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing: Potential
Eects on Gendered Employment in Pakistan." International Labour Review 144 (4):
401-421.
[22] |||-. 2009. The Trade and Gender Interface: A Perspective from Pakistan. Sus-
tainable Development Policy Institute.
(http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17857/Siegmann2009.pdf, downloaded February 2012)
[23] Sultana, Nargis, Hina Nazli and Sohail J. Malik. 1994. "Determinants of Female Time
Allocation in Selected Districts of Rural Pakistan." Pakistan Economic Review 33
(4) Part II (Winter): 1141-1153.
[24] Wood, Adrian. 1991. "North-South Trade and Female Labour in Manufacturing: An
Asymmetry." Journal of Development Studies 27 (2): 168-189.
23
China, 102076
Pakistan, 3615
Sri Lanka, 3382
Thailand, 2661
Others, 53397
Bangladesh, 16335
Vietnam, 11247
India, 10550
Indonesia, 7595
Cambodia, 4553
Figure 1: Exports of Garments (HS code 61 and 62) to USA, EU, Canada and Japan in 2011 (USD
million)
Source: United Nations, COMTRADE Database.
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Figure 2: Year to Year Growth of Exports of Knitwear/Woven Wear Products to USA, EU, Canada,
Japan Before and After the MFA Phase-Out
Source: Same as Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Unit Price (USD/Kg) of Knitwear/Woven Wear imported to the EU in 2004 and in 2011
Source: Same as Figure 1.
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Figure 4: Change in Unit Price (Value/Weight = USD/Kg) of Knitwear/Woven Wear Imported to the
EU in the post-MFA Period (Ination Adjusted)
Source: Same as Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Composition of Pakistan's Exports (1980-2010)
Source: Same as Figure 1.
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Figure 6: How do you like your current job?
Source: Same as Table 6.
28
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
no
t s
afe
fee
l sh
am
e
m
ale
 
m
em
be
rs
 
up
se
t
ne
gle
ct 
ho
us
eh
old
 
re
sp
on
sib
iliti
es
he
alt
h c
on
ce
rn
oth
er
no
t s
afe
fee
l sh
am
e
m
ale
 
m
em
be
rs
 
up
se
t
ne
gle
ct 
ho
us
eh
old
 
re
sp
on
sib
iliti
es
he
alt
h c
on
ce
rn
oth
er
female non-stitcher stitcher
D
e
n
si
ty
Figure 7: Why not willing to work outside?
Source: Same as Table 6.
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Table 1: Wages in garment industry of major exporters in 2006 (USD)
Annual wage per worker Share of female worker over total
workers in the sector
Pakistan 1,901 0.105
India 1,246 0.449
Sri Lanka 1,077 0.772
China 1,844 n.a.
Indonesia 1,323 0.793
Thailand 1,909 0.782
(1996 price)
Pakistan 1,883
Bangladesh 320
Vietnam 597
Sources: UNIDO, INDSTAT4 2011, INDSTAT3 2006.
Notes: Bangladesh data is 1998 data, deated with the 1996 price. Vietnam data is 2000 data, deated
with the 1996 price.
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Table 3: Preference of piece rate workers
(a) Why prefer piece rate status?
Number of piece
rate workers
Total (number of sewing operators) 171 (153)
Willing to stay at piece rate status 122
Reasons (one
choice)
Higher earnings 96
Freedom 23
Shorter working hours 2
On-time payment 1
(b) Why prefer xed salary status?
Number of piece
rate workers
Total (number of sewing operators) 171 (153)
Willing to be hired at xed salary status 47
Reasons (multiple
choices)
Higher earnings 20
Shorter working hours 1
Better working environment 2
Job security 31
Other 11
Source: Same as Table 2.
Notes: 'Other' includes lower workload at xed rates (1 (number of respondents)), desire to
use paid holidays (3), predictability and stability of earnings (5), protection under the legal
minimum wage of 4,000 Pakistan rupees (1), and desire to be a supervisor, who is usually
hired at xed rates (1).
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Table 4: OLS estimation of earnings equation
variables ln (hourly wage rate in Aug 2006)
education 0.0451***
(0.0131)
workexperience 0.0108
(0.0102)
workexperience^2 0.000242
(0.000429)
male(dummy) 0.182***
(0.0522)
married(dummy) 0.0116
(0.0357)
supervisor(dummy) 0.350***
(0.0638)
helper(dummy) -0.226***
(0.0440)
knitwear(dummy) 0.163**
(0.0651)
piecerate(dummy) 0.123***
(0.0403)
Constant 8.060***
(0.224)
Observations 315
R-squared 0.394
Source: The data is based on a survey conducted by the author in Au-
gust 2006. Respondents were randomly selected from each factory on
a list provided by the Small and Medium Size Enterprises Development
Authority (SMEDA).
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (***signicant at 1%,
**at 5%, *at 10%). Factory size dummies are included in the RHS. The
dummy variable "knitwear" = 1 if the factory mainly produces knitwear
and = 0 if woven wear. The dummy variable "piecerate" = 1 if the
respondent is paid at piece rates.
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Table 5: Attitude toward women working in the factory
(a) Willingness of GM/owners/directors to hire female employees
Scale %
1-denitely would not want to employ 5.7
2-would not want to employ 7.8
3-probably would not want to employ 14.9
4-might or might not want to employ 7.8
5-probably would want to employ 12.1
6-would want to employ 27.0
7-denitely would want to employ 24.8
(b) Willingness of workers/supervisors to send daughter/sister to work in the same factory
Scale %
1-denitely will not allow her to work 35.2
2-will not allow her to work 18.4
3-probably will not allow her to work 8.6
4-might or might not allow her to work 13.7
5-probably will allow her to work 8.5
6-will allow her to work 12.4
7-denitely will allow her to work 3.2
Source: Haque (2009).
Notes: Panel (a) is based on 355 GM/Owners/Directors of garment factories of dierent sizes. The
question was how likely they were to hire women if they were looking for workers. The respondents
answered on a 1 (strongly not willing to hire) to 7 (strongly willing) scale. Panel (b) is based on
2,662 Female/Male Workers/Supervisors of garment factories of dierent sizes. The question was
how likely they were to allow a sister/daughter to work in their factory. The respondents answered
on a 1 (strongly not willing to allow) to 7 (strongly willing) scale.
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Table 6: Summary statistics (sample means)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type I
households
Type II
households
t-value (2)-(1) Households
with women
working
outside
Households
without
women work-
ing outside
t-value (4)-(3)
fhead(female household head);
yes=1
0.327 0.098 -4.77*** 0.279 0.068 -5.787***
(0.471) (0.297) (0.450) (0.253)
head age (head's age) 47.280 46.474 -0.566 47.694 46.007 -1.380
(12.910) (13.150) (12.802) (13.243)
head edu (head's education level) 1.869 2.461 3.481*** 1.874 2.611 4.635***
(1.428) (1.904) (1.501) (1.948)
head lit (head=literate); yes=1 0.234 0.320 1.804* 0.213 0.355 3.434***
(0.425) (0.467) (0.411) (0.479)
muslim; yes=1 0.925 0.908 -0.586 0.869 0.939 2.429**
(0.264) (0.290) (0.338) (0.241)
kammee (traditional service caste);
yes=1
0.542 0.515 -0.494 0.601 0.471 -2.792***
(0.501) (0.500) (0.491) (0.500)
migration; yes=1 0.093 0.030 -2.148** 0.066 0.031 -1.664*
(0.292) (0.170) (0.248) (0.173)
n hh (number of household mem-
bers)
6.318 6.268 -0.202 6.333 6.246 -0.382
(2.099) (2.632) (2.281) (2.661)
n infant (number of children aged 0-
5)
0.280 0.824 6.534*** 0.448 0.860 4.512***
(0.626) (1.095) (0.887) (1.087)
b nonenroll (number of boys aged 6-
15 who are not enrolled at school)
0.068 0.117 1.456 0.089 0.117 0.759
(0.253) (0.437) (0.340) (0.440)
g nonenroll (number of girls aged 6-
15 who are not enrolled at school)
0.184 0.150 -0.584 0.240 0.107 -2.513**
(0.538) (0.509) (0.630) (0.422)
farmland (land for cultivation in
acres)
0 0.482 7.635*** 0.086 0.553 5.551***
(1.213) (0.496) (1.297)
v livestock (value of livestock in
Rs.)
5679 73045 7.526*** 17239 83334 5.425***
(22137) (166730) (93632) (171343)
totalhhinc (annual household in-
come in Rs.)
184953 171162 -1.449 181335 169845 -1.121
(72371) (124030) (98559) 123439
mhhinc (annual household income
earned by males in Rs.)
80813 157491 8.750*** 97379 167033 7.399***
(63512) (120124) (81648) (123666)
fbreadwin (breadwinner=female);
yes=1
0.692 0.060 -11.81*** 0.503 0.014 -11.72***
(0.464) (0.237) (0.501) (0.116)
v homeplusland (value of home and
land for residence in Rs.)
510327 742222 4.107*** 554836 774573 4.222***
(473768) (634534) (461516) (672904)
qlife (quality of life index) 4.626 4.878 1.455 4.557 4.986 2.548***
(1.451) (1.950) (1.692) (1.928)
v borrow (total debt in Rs.) 21967 17780 -0.760 21229 17164 -0.804
(49987) (50098) (58542) (44032)
n fteacher (number of female teach-
ers among relatives)
0.121 0.076 -0.898 0.158 0.041 -2.787***
(0.490) (0.353) (0.537) (0.245)
n fgov (number of female govern-
ment worker among relatives)
0.084 0.024 -1.178 0.082 0.010 -2.154**
(0.516) (0.171) (0.443) (0.101)
n fwork (number of female non
teach/gov workers outside for pay
among relatives)
1.243 0.320 -3.740*** 1.098 0.171 -5.592***
(2.483) (1.106) (2.115) (0.950)
fout y (any female member working
outside); yes=1
1 0.206 -37.67*** 1 0
(0.405)
fwork good (head cosiders female
working outside positively); yes=1
0.589 0.436 -2.806*** 0.694 0.331 -8.271***
(0.494) (0.497) (0.462) (0.471)
Observations 107 369 183 293
Source: The data is based on the household survey conducted by the author in May-July 2012.
Notes: t-values with unequal variances are reported (***signicant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Education
level: 1= no eduction; 2= below primary (less than 5 years old); 3= primary completed (5 years); 4= middle completed (8 years); 5= matric
completed (10 years); 6= intermediate completed (12 years); 7= degree & post graduate. "Kammee" is the traditional service caste in the
village economy. They are lower caste and work as carpenter, barber, blacksmith, laundry men, cook, tailor, etc., providing their services to the
land-owning farmers (zamindar). The "quality-of-life index" is constructed by whether the household owns the following items: sewing machine,
generator, TV, electric fan, telephone (land-line), cell phone, refrigerator, bicycle, and motor cycle.
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Table 7: Why not working outside the home?
No. Reason Sample means
1 No skill to do such work; yes=1 0.048
2 Cannot nd such work; yes=1 0.017
3 No transportation available; yes=1 0
4 Male family members do not allow; yes=1 0.611
5 No time due to housekeeping works; yes=1 0.375
6 Not necessary; yes=1 0.177
7 Own health concern; yes=1 0.130
8 Do not like to work outside the home; yes=1 0.078
Source: Same as Table 6.
Notes: The total number of female respondents is 291, all from house-
holds with no woman working outside.
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Table 8: Probability of letting female members work outside (mean marginal eects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prob (work as
a stitcher)
Prob (work
outside)
Prob (work
as a stitcher);
unmarried
only
Prob (work
outside);
unmarried
only
Prob (work
as a stitcher);
households
with female
workers out-
side only
fhead(female household head);
yes=1
0.117*** 0.151** 0.0524 0.0899 0.0985
(0.0430) (0.0624) (0.0918) (0.0929) (0.0955)
head age (head's age) -0.00439 -0.00224 0.0124* 0.0181* 0.000589
(0.00378) (0.00377) (0.00698) (0.0109) (0.00997)
headage sq (head's age square) -8.19e-07 -4.72e-06 -0.000202*** -0.000240** -6.35e-05
(3.39e-05) (3.12e-05) (6.91e-05) (0.000109) (0.000109)
head edu (head's education level) 0.00950 -0.0449 0.0662 -0.112 0.109
(0.0253) (0.0388) (0.0969) (0.0967) (0.100)
head edu sq (head's education
square)
-0.00219 0.00516 -0.00777 0.0232 -0.0157
(0.00349) (0.00572) (0.0130) (0.0161) (0.0129)
muslim; yes=1 0.0239 -0.0723 0.0797 0.228* -0.00919
(0.0605) (0.0929) (0.111) (0.120) (0.0900)
kammee (traditional service caste);
yes=1
0.00435 0.0486 3.05e-05 0.128*** -0.0547
(0.0299) (0.0340) (0.0681) (0.0481) (0.0586)
n male (number of male household
members)
-0.0129 -0.0180 -0.0594 -0.0150 0.00874
(0.0145) (0.0159) (0.0381) (0.0308) (0.0375)
n nifemale (number of non-infant
female household members)
0.0344*** 0.0567*** 0.0120 0.0435*** 0.0359***
(0.00968) (0.0108) (0.0268) (0.0155) (0.0122)
n infant (number of children aged 0-
5)
-0.0385** -0.00608 0.00435 0.0219 -0.0779***
(0.0184) (0.0216) (0.0262) (0.0227) (0.0277)
lnlivestock (log of value of live-
stock)
-0.00891** -0.00995** -0.0208** 0.00215 -0.0280***
(0.00413) (0.00418) (0.00881) (0.00706) (0.00692)
lnmhhinc (log of income earned by
males)
-0.00464 -0.0380** -0.0195 -0.314*** -0.000525
(0.00437) (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0577) (0.0111)
lnhomeland (log of value of home
and residential land)
-0.0190*** -0.0196*** -0.0313*** -0.0153** -0.0269***
(0.00277) (0.00514) (0.00724) (0.00691) (0.00542)
lnborrow (log of value of borrow-
ings)
0.00493 0.00251 0.00272 -0.00604 0.0100
(0.00330) (0.00346) (0.00645) (0.00677) (0.00748)
n fteacher (number of female teach-
ers among relatives)
0.0330 0.174** 0.0106 0.464*** 0.0330
(0.0230) (0.0761) (0.0403) (0.0723) (0.0444)
n fgov (number of female govern-
ment workers among relatives)
0.0584 0.237** 0.0333 0.237 0.189
(0.0734) (0.115) (0.122) (0.194) (0.179)
n fwork (number of female non
teach/gov workers outside for pay
among relatives)
0.0283*** 0.0667*** 0.0365 0.0326 -0.000911
(0.00512) (0.0219) (0.0318) (0.0263) (0.0139)
woman edu (female respondent's
education level)
0.0774* 0.0424 0.129** 0.0898** 0.166
(0.0422) (0.0462) (0.0533) (0.0420) (0.109)
woman edu sq (female respondent's
education square)
-0.0150** -0.00805 -0.0274*** -0.0180*** -0.0346**
(0.00653) (0.00626) (0.00739) (0.00551) (0.0159)
woman age (female respondent's
age)
0.0198 0.00982 0.171** 0.187*** 0.0532
(0.0153) (0.0103) (0.0836) (0.0667) (0.0448)
womanage sq (female respondent's
age square)
-0.000325 -8.31e-05 -0.00319* -0.00335*** -0.00102
(0.000247) (0.000125) (0.00169) (0.00118) (0.000778)
hh daughter (female respon-
dent=head's daughter); yes=1
0.218*** 0.241*** 0.220***
(0.0564) (0.0872) (0.0659)
Observations 446 446 149 144 152
Source: Same as Table 6.
Notes: Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (***signicant at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%). Village xed eects
are included in the estimation. The estimation excludes households where the female respondent of the women's questionnaire is
also the head of the household.
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Table 9: Attitude toward women working outside (mean marginal eects)
(1) (2)
Prob (head's attitude
positive)
Prob (woman's atti-
tude positive)
fhead(female household head); yes=1 0.213* 0.0109
(0.115) (0.107)
head age (head's age) 0.00824 -0.00296
(0.0125) (0.00929)
headage sq (head's age square) -0.000103 2.86e-05
(0.00011) (0.00007)
head edu (head's education level) 0.0145 -0.0686***
(0.0191) (0.0172)
head lit (head=literate); yes=1 -0.0783 0.0814*
(0.113) (0.0488)
muslim; yes=1 -0.242*** -0.217*
(0.0878) (0.112)
kammee (traditional service caste); yes=1 -0.0239 -0.00973
(0.0980) (0.0661)
n male (number of male household members) 0.0212 -0.0612**
(0.0156) (0.0268)
n nifemale (number of non-infant female
household members)
-0.0273 0.0286*
(0.0250) (0.0155)
n infant (number of children aged 0-5) -0.0469** 0.0551***
(0.0184) (0.0171)
farmland (land for cultivation in acres) 0.061 0.0908**
(0.0407) (0.0428)
lnlivestock (log of value of livestock) -0.000365 -0.0121**
(0.0077) (0.00545)
lnmhhinc (log of income earned by males) -0.0228 -0.0334**
(0.0169) (0.0168)
lnhomeland (log of value of home and residen-
tial land)
-0.00807 -0.00889*
(0.00518) (0.0053)
lnborrow (log of value of borrowings) -0.0135*** -0.000724
(0.00402) (0.00525)
n fteachergov (number of female teach-
ers/government workers among relatives)
0.115 0.311**
(0.0875) (0.131)
n fwork (number of female non teach/gov
workers outside for pay among relatives)
0.0625*** 0.0184
(0.0176) (0.0186)
woman edu (female respondent's education
level)
0.0619***
(0.0175)
woman lit (female respondent=literate);
yes=1
-0.0621
(0.0843)
woman age (female respondent's age) 0.00276
(0.00703)
womanage sq (female respondent's age square) -3.78e-05
(0.0001)
dwoman married (female respon-
dent=married); yes=1
0.0404
(0.0582)
Observations 446 446
Source: Same as Table 6.
Notes: Cluster (village)-robust standard errors are in parentheses (***signicant at 1%, **at 5%, *at
10%). Village xed eects are included in the estimation. The estimation excludes households where
the female respondent of the women's questionnaire is also the head of the household.
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Appendix A Appendix Tables
Table A1: Summary statistics of workers in the garment industry in Lahore
Variables Mean
wage06 (Pakistan Rupee) 30.09
(12.81)
education 3.479
(1.619)
workexperience (years) 7.119
(5.234)
male(dummy) 0.855
(0.353)
married(dummy) 0.426
(0.495)
supervisor(dummy) 0.066
(0.249)
helper(dummy) 0.088
(0.284)
n employee < 200 0.088
(0.284)
n employee < 400 0.202
(0.402)
n employee < 600 0.524
(0.500)
n employee < 1000 0.634
(0.482)
n employee < 2000 0.776
(0.418)
n employee < 3000 0.861
(0.346)
n employee < 4000 0.940
(0.238)
n employee  4000 0.060
(0.238)
knitwear(dummy) 0.590
(0.493)
piecerate(dummy) 0.539
(0.499)
Observations 315
Source: Same as Table 4.
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The variable "wage06" is the hourly wage rate in
August 2006. The variable "education" takes discrete values: = 1 if no education, = 2 if below
primary, = 3 if primary (5 years) completed, = 4 if middle (8 years) completed, = 5 if matric (10
years) completed, = 6 if intermediate (10 years) completed, = 7 if degree or post graduate. The
variable "knitwear" = 1 if the factory mainly produces knitwear, = 0 if woven wear. The dummy
variable "piecerate" = 1 if the respondent is paid at piece rates.
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Table A2: OLS estimation of earnings equation (growth in earnings)
Variables Percentage growth in earnings 2004-2006
education 0.00268
(0.0171)
workexperience -0.0492***
(0.0147)
workexperience^2 0.00146***
(0.000500)
workhoursweek 0.00306
(0.00458)
male(dummy) 0.0648
(0.0866)
married(dummy) -0.0900**
(0.0363)
supervisor(dummy) 0.124
(0.0833)
helper(dummy) -0.186***
(0.0711)
knitwear(dummy) -0.123
(0.104)
piecerate(dummy) -0.283***
(0.0573)
Constant 0.560**
(0.271)
Observations 290
R-squared 0.240
Source: Same as Table 4.
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses (***signianct at 1%, **at 5%, *at 10%). Factory size
dummies are included in the RHS. The variable "knitwear" = 1 if the factory mainly produces knitwear,
= 0 if woven wear. The dummy variable "piecerate" = 1 if the respondent is paid at piece rates.
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